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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ADLER V. DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD: AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR ESTABLISHING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS ON
STUDENT-ELECTED, STUDENT-LED PRAYER IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario: A family of four has recently been forced to relocate
because the local factory in Anytown, U.S.A. has been closed and all workers
have been laid off. With no job and no way to make a living, the family has no
choice but to move. After having spent the last twenty years in Anytown, the
family has to find a new community in which to find a home and settle. The
timing of the lay-offs hits the family particularly hard because the school year
has already started. A decision must, therefore, quickly be reached as to where
to relocate so that the children can avoid being out of school for any serious
length of time.
In deciding where to move, the family looks at several factors, including
the availability of permanent employment, the size of the community, and the
reputation of the school district. The family selects Someplace, U.S.A. as their
destination and moves into their new neighborhood. The parents go back to
work and the two children start school in the local public schools. The oldest
child is a teenager in the twelfth grade and the younger sibling is in the eighth
grade.
Because of the timing of the relocation, the children are integrated into
their new schools in the middle of the school term. As a result, the oldest child
missed out on the opportunity to vote in an election at the high school
regarding the graduation ceremony for the senior class. In accordance with a
school district policy entitled, “Invocation at Graduation”, the students had
voted on whether or not to deliver an invocation at graduation, with a majority
of the students having voted in favor of delivering an invocation. In a followup election, in which the oldest child is able to participate, the students choose
the student who will deliver the invocation. As luck would have it, the
students extend the privilege of delivering the invocation at graduation to the
“new kid”; a gesture to welcome the newest senior and to make everybody feel
a part of the graduation; and an honor to the teen, but one of mixed blessing.
The oldest child returns home to deliver the news that the students have
elected him to deliver an invocation at graduation. The news is delivered with
enthusiasm on the one hand, for the teen has been singled out and recognized
by his peers, but, on the other, is tempered with inner conflict and a fear of
161
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disappointing his family and new friends. The problem stems from the
difference in the form and substance of the family’s religious belief system in
relation to the rest of the community. The oldest child feels pressured to
deliver an invocation consistent with the form of worship practiced by the
majority of the community but has difficulty reconciling that with the belief
system subscribed to by the family.
The parents are concerned that their teenager is being pressured to offer a
prayer that is inconsistent with their family’s traditional form of worship.
They feel that any prayer offered, which differs in form from their traditional
practice, would represent a rejection of their faith. They also worry that
exposing the family’s belief system, by openly challenging the school’s policy,
might result in condemnation of the family in the community and isolation and
harassment of the children at school. The parents ultimately decide to raise
their concerns with the principal at the high school and with school district
administrators.
In confronting the school officials, the parents are met with hostility and
resistance to flexibility in choosing whether the invocation should be delivered
and the form it should take if given. They are threatened that should they
decide to challenge the school policy, every teacher in the district will be told
which family has dared challenge the beliefs of the community. Eventually, the
children’s classmates will also find out, as will their families and, undoubtedly,
some strong feelings of animosity will be directed towards the sole family
challenging a school policy supported by the rest of the community. What the
family had not realized upon moving to Someplace was that the majority of
their new community predominantly attended one church. Almost every
community leader, school board member, school administrator, teacher, and
student attended this church, and as a group they had decided prayer at
graduation was a policy that would help preserve the solemnity of the
ceremony and provide the proper mood.
The family now faces a nearly impossible decision. If they do nothing, and
tolerate the religious beliefs of the majority of the community, their children
will not be free to exercise their religious beliefs. They will be forced to
practice the religious beliefs of others, particularly in light of the second
election, selecting the teenager to be the voice of an invocation that he had no
say in determining the very existence of. On the other hand, if the family
decides to challenge the policy as a violation of the Constitutional ban on
governmental establishment of religion, they are sure to invoke the wrath of
the community, a community which they elected to move to, buy a house, and
in which to raise their family. The family will surely become ostracized at the
very least and may even, in an extreme case, be subjected to bomb threats, or
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even worse, death threats. It is just this sort of Hobson’s choice scenario1 that
has unfortunately become all too familiar in communities across the United
States.2
Religious expression in public schools is a hot-button topic and one in
which people tend to feel very strongly either for or against. In evaluating the
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with religious expression, one gets
the sense that recent developments, extending the power of the Establishment
Clause3 to invalidate a school policy permitting student-elected, student-led
prayer at a school activity as voluntary as a football game,4 have set the tone
for future challenges to public school district policies that attempt to integrate
religious practices or beliefs where participation is anything more than
completely the voluntary action of an individual student.
The question arises, by extending the scope of its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, whether the Supreme Court has provided a test, bright line or
otherwise, for determining what kinds of public school religious policies will

1. This scenario represents a Hobson’s choice because it envisions a decision with no real
viable alternatives. In this case, the family can either decide to look the other way and sacrifice
their beliefs, or they can choose to stand up for their beliefs, which may lead to intimidation from
school officials and others within the community. For examples of this very scenario playing
itself out in real life, see infra note 2. In some instances, courts have recognized the need to
protect families who are threatened for bringing claims against schools that institute religious
practices by allowing the families to file their claim anonymously. Courts have even extended
protection of these families to include sanctions for any person in the community who seeks out
the identity of the anonymous families. The sanctions may embody a stern warning threatening
contempt and even criminal liability. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the District
Court issued this warning to the “school [district] administration, officials, counselors, teachers,
employees or servants of the School District, parents, students or anyone else”, that:
ANYONE TAKING ANY ACTION ON SCHOOL PROPERTY, DURING SCHOOL
HOURS, OR WITH SCHOOL RESOURCES OR APPROVAL FOR PURPOSES OF
ATTEMPTING TO ELICIT THE NAMES OR IDENTITIES OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN
THIS CAUSE OF ACTION, BY OR ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THESE
INDIVIDUALS, WILL FACE THE HARSHEST POSSIBLE CONTEMPT
SANCTIONS FROM THIS COURT, AND MAY ADDITIONALLY FACE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY. The Court wants these proceedings addressed on their merits, and not on the
basis of intimidation or harassment of the participants on either side.
120 S. Ct. 2266, 2271 n.1 (2000).
2. See generally FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 3-18 (1999) (describing, in a chapter
entitled “From Riots to Harassment,” several instances of communities rising up in anger against
the family challenging a school policy that advocates religion); ROBERT S. ALLEY, WITHOUT A
PRAYER: RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 24 (1996) [hereinafter WITHOUT A
PRAYER] (including “real-life stories of parents and children who, in exercising [their
Constitutional] rights, have been harassed, taunted, insulted, and harmed by zealous citizens
seeking to impose a particular definition of religion in public institutions”).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
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be held unconstitutional. An examination of a recent Eleventh Circuit case,
Adler v. Duval County School Board,5 in both of its incarnations, in light of the
Santa Fe decision, should shed some light on this question. This Note will
examine how the Santa Fe decision impacts on a split between the Fifth and
the Third and Ninth Circuits6 by examining the Eleventh Circuit’s Adler
decisions.7 Further, this Note will also discuss how the outcome in Adler
might give the U.S. Supreme Court an opportunity to expand their
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to go further than Santa Fe in limiting
student-elected, student-led school prayer. Focusing on how the Santa Fe
decision affected Adler will also shed some light on whether or not the
Supreme Court resolved the Circuit split. Ultimately, this Note will argue that
by extending the Establishment Clause to invalidate a school policy adopting
student initiated prayer at school events as voluntary as football games, the
Supreme Court established that school endorsed prayer at less voluntary
occasions, like school graduation ceremonies, will not be tolerated. The
Eleventh Circuit found a context, however, in the Adler case, in which studentelected, student-led prayer at a high school graduation was constitutional. This
Note will focus on the ultimate resolution of the constitutionality of school
prayer in the student-elected, student-led context to see to what extent prayer at
an event like high school graduation should be permitted. The key will be
whether the state has taken action to establish school prayer, which triggers the
protections of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The focus will be
on the extent to which the Supreme Court will construe student-elected,
student-led prayer to be state action. The final analysis will suggest that where
it appears school districts are attempting to circumvent the prohibition against
state establishment of school prayer by way of student-elected, student-led
prayer, courts should find that the offered speech is not private speech, but
rather public speech, endorsed by the state, in order to protect the minority
5. 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.) (en banc) [hereinafter Adler I], vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000)
(remanding the case for “further consideration in light of Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, 121 S. Ct. 2266 (2000)), reinstated, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880 (11th Cir.) (en banc)
[hereinafter Adler II].
6. To illustrate the Circuit split, see Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 977
F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding student elected school prayer at graduation was permitted);
ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir.
1996) (en banc) (holding student elected school prayer at graduation was unconstitutional); Harris
v. Joint School District No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot 515 U.S. 1154
(1995) (holding that student initiated, student planned graduation exercises that included prayer
were unconstitutional). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Harris case was dismissed because
the student had already graduated and was no longer subject to injury; hence no case or
controversy existed. 515 U.S. 1154.
7. The Eleventh Circuit sided with the Fifth Circuit’s holding and rationale in the Adler
decision. See Adler I, 206 F.3d at 1079 n.7, 1082-83. See also Adler II, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
8880.
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from the tyranny of the majority that is evolving by way of an unconstitutional,
pretextual state establishment of religion, the decisions by the Eleventh Circuit
in the Adler case notwithstanding.
The scope of this paper is such that it would be overreaching to include a
complete history of the Religion clauses and the jurisprudential development
of all relevant doctrines. Instead this paper will focus on the cases which have
led up to the recent school prayer decisions to properly put into context the
current conflict over whether student-elected, student-led school prayer
represents an unconstitutional violation of the prohibition against state
establishment of religion.
II. BACKGROUND
The debate over the governmental endorsement of religion can be traced
back to the time of the writing and ratification of the United States
Constitution, and more specifically, to language the Framers included in the
First Amendment.8 The language in the First Amendment provides that,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”9 Much has been written on the
consequences of this language, including the debate over which clause takes
precedence, the prohibition against establishing religion or the prohibition
against restraining free exercise.10
Particular regard must be paid to the intent of the Framers, as it was they
who laid the framework for the definitions and the consequences of the
language they chose to employ. James Madison gave us a glimpse of the
rationale behind the addition of a religion clause to the First Amendment when
he wrote, “[w]ho does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same
ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other sects?”11 In this
sense, Madison recognized that giving the power to establish religion gave the
majority an opportunity to tyrannize the minority. In addition, it was Thomas
Jefferson who first gave life to the phrase “separation of church and state”
when he wrote, “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between church and state.” Given
8. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000); RAVITCH, supra note 2; ROBERT S.
ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1994)
[hereinafter SCHOOL PRAYER].
11. Robert S. Alley, On Behalf of Religious Liberty: James Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance, 12 THIS CONST. 26, 27, 29 (1986).
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these positions, it seems that the Founding Fathers recognized the primary
importance of the Establishment clause’s prohibition against the government
establishing religion as paramount in preserving an individual’s right to Free
Exercise.12 By contemplating the historical setting in which the Framers found
themselves, this position, seeking to abolish any form of governmental tyranny
with regard to religious expression, seems particularly prudent, especially in
light of the reasons many colonists left Europe to “form a more perfect
Union”,13 to escape religious persecution.
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, almost eighty years after
the ratification of the First Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”14 The incorporation of
First Amendment protections by the Fourteenth Amendment is significant
because it makes applicable the protections of the Religion clauses to state
actions.15 Thus, citizens are protected not only from actions by the federal
government but also from state actions that violate the provisions of the
Religion clauses.
The first United States Supreme Court case to take up the issue of the
applicability of the Religion clauses to the states was handed down seventy
years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v.
Connecticut.16 In Cantwell, the Court held, “[t]he fundamental concept of
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”17 The Court recognized that the
Religion clauses of the First Amendment have a “double aspect” when Justice
Roberts, for a unanimous Court, wrote:
On the one hand, [the First Amendment] forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. . . . On the
other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus

12. For a fascinating discussion of the consequence of accommodating Free Exercise at the
expense of Establishment, see WITHOUT A PRAYER, supra note 2, at 56-58. In his discussion,
Professor Alley writes, “[o]nly complete separation of church and state, with absolutely no
establishment, will guarantee free exercise of religion.” Id. at 56. He goes on to add:
If free exercise is a natural right not conferred by any state, then any allowance for the
control of conscience of any person or group, no matter how small, is a denial of the
principle of free exercise for all others whatsoever. Indeed, there are degrees of
establishment but there are no degrees of freedom of conscience: it’s all or none.
Id. at 56.
13. U.S. CONST. preamble.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
15. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).
16. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
17. Id. at 303.
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the Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.18

The Court thus acknowledged that the freedom to act, while a component of
the free exercise protection, was not without a limit by holding that, “[c]onduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of the
protection.”19 In turn the state must be able to justify its limitation of the
freedom to act under the guise of “protection of society,” because “[i]n every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”20 This case
signaled further development of the Religion clause doctrines because
boundaries had not been erected to establish the limits of the First
Amendment’s prohibition against state establishment of religion and, in light
of Cantwell, the limit to when and how a state could encroach on the freedom
of expression in the name of “protection of society.”
The next case to come before the Supreme Court, relevant to this
discussion, which implicated the Religion clauses was Engel v. Vitale.21 In
Engel, Justice Black, writing for a 6-1 Court,22 declared a New York public
school program of daily classroom prayer unconstitutional. The Board of
Education of Union Free School District No. 9 enacted a daily prayer program
that directed the “principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by
each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day:
‘Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we be Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.’”23 In his
opinion, Justice Black wrote:
We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the
Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no doubt
that New York’s program of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as
prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious activity. . . . The nature of such
a prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this and
the trial court expressly so found . . . . The New York laws officially
prescribing the Regents’ prayer are inconsistent both with the purpose of the
Establishment Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself.24

This decision was a critical acknowledgement of two things. One, that the
School District was an arm of the State and thus, any action taken by a school
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 304.
Id.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision. Id. at 436.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 424-25, 433.
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board was a state action governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. And two,
that a prayer acknowledging “God” was enough to show an unconstitutional
establishment of religion.25
The next in this line of Establishment clause cases to come before the
Supreme Court was School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.26 In
Schempp, the Court found two school policies of Bible reading and recitation
of the Lord’s Prayer unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds.27 The
policy that Pennsylvania instituted required that, “[a]t least ten verses from the
Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public
school on each school day.”28 The Abington Township school district
complied with the Pennsylvania law by broadcasting, under the supervision of
a teacher, a recitation of the Bible verses and the Lord’s Prayer into each
classroom.29 Furthermore, students in the various classrooms were “asked to
stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison.”30 The other school policy
being challenged, from Baltimore, Maryland, consisted of a similar “reading,
without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord’s
Prayer.”31 Both policies permitted students, with permission from their
parents, to voluntarily remove themselves from participating in the exercises.32
The Court held both policies were unconstitutional because the State, in effect,
violated the rule of “strict neutrality” by instituting a policy that showed a
preference for religion.33 The Court further held, “[t]he State must be
steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith, and neither favor nor inhibit
religion.”34
The Schempp decision was a consolidation of two cases on appeal.35 The
holding in these two cases is significant because both school districts’ policies
25. This second point is worth noting because God can mean different things to different
people, and therefore, state action that imposed a prayer to “God” in this case arguably did not
establish any particular religion. If viewed in the context that not everyone prays, and of those
individuals who do pray, not everyone prays to God, it looks more and more like the simple
prayer to God establishes Christianity to the exclusion of other belief systems that may not
incorporate a deity named God.
26. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
27. Id. at 205.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 206-07.
30. Id. at 207.
31. Id. at 211.
32. Id. at 205, 212 n.4.
33. Id. at 295-96. The Court defined the rule of “strict neutrality” as a directive from the
First Amendment that “commands not official hostility toward religion, but only a strict neutrality
in matters of religion.” Id. at 295.
34. Id. at 299.
35. See Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
aff’d, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Murray v. Curlett, 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962), rev’d sub nom. School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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of Bible reading and prayer recitation were held to be unconstitutional. Also
of significance in this consolidation, in light of the beliefs of the challengers, is
the outcome of the school policy that was contested in Murray v. Curlett.36
Murray was an action, filed in state court, to compel rescission and
cancellation of the school board policy.37 The complainants were professed
atheists.38 The Maryland trial court dismissed the case, without leave to
amend, on motion by the school board.39 The Maryland Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision.40 In holding the school district’s policy to be
unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court recognized the rights of an
atheist family in regard to their right to be free from the tyranny of the majority
belief. The Court had established that any school policy that showed
preference for religion was unconstitutional, without regard to whether a
majority of the community accepted the policy.
The case of Lemon v. Kurtzman41 presented the Court with another
Establishment Clause case regarding state funding of private, parochial
schools.42 The Lemon decision was also a consolidated decision, challenging
state laws in Rhode Island43 and Pennsylvania.44 In both states, statutes had
been enacted that provided state money for private schools and were
challenged as violating, among other things, the First Amendment Religion
clauses.45 In its decision, the Court held that the state statutes were
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds because the state had become
too entangled with religion.46
The Lemon case also represents a significant doctrinal development in the
Court’s First Amendment religion clause jurisprudence. In its decision the
Court established a three-part test to determine whether a state action was a
violation of the First Amendment’s prohibition against establishment.47 The

36. 179 A.2d 698 (Md. 1962).
37. Id. at 699.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 704.
41. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
42. Id. at 606.
43. Id. (“Rhode Island ha[d] adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers
in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary.”). See also DiCenso
v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 113, 114 (D.R.I. 1970), aff’d sub nom, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
44. 403 U.S. at 606 (“Pennsylvania ha[d] adopted a statutory program that provide[d]
financial support to nonpublic . . . schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers’
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.”). See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev’d, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. 403 U.S. at 606.
46. Id. at 606, 614, 615, 625.
47. Id. at 612-13.
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Lemon test’s three elements required that a state law have: a) a secular
purpose; b) a primary effect that “neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and
c) no “excessive government entanglement with religion.”48 The Court had
thus created a test by which to assess the constitutionality of state action in the
face of the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.
The next development in the Court’s extension of the religion clauses came
in the case of Stone v. Graham.49 This case represents an extension of the
prohibition against the establishment of religion because the Court held
unconstitutional a Kentucky law requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments “on the wall of each public classroom in the State.”50 The
posters with the Ten Commandments were not purchased by the schools, but
were instead purchased by way of private contributions.51 The case originated
in the Kentucky court system where at both the trial level and at the Kentucky
Supreme Court, the courts found that the Kentucky law could comport with a
“secular program of education” and was, therefore, not unconstitutional.52 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, applied the Lemon test and
found, contrary to the Kentucky courts, that the Kentucky law violated the
secular purpose requirement.53 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist expressed his
view that the Court should have given more deference to the secular purpose
articulated by the Kentucky legislature and supported by the Kentucky
courts.54 This would not be the last time the elements of the Lemon test were
criticized.55
Another important decision, this time holding state action was not in
violation of the Establishment clause, came in the case of Lynch v. Donnelly.56
This case involved the City of Pawtucket’s incorporation of a Nativity scene in
its annual Christmas display.57 The display included a Christmas tree, a Santa

48. Id.
49. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 39, 41.
51. Id. at 39.
52. Stone v. Graham, 599 S.W.2d 157, 157-58 (Ky.) (per curiam) (Clayton, J., concurring),
rev’d, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
53. 449 U.S. at 40-41.
54. Id. at 43-44. The secular purpose articulated by the Kentucky Legislature related to the
impact the Ten Commandments have had “on the development of secular legal codes of the
Western World.” Id. at 45.
55. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 39799 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In his particularly colorful concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
likened the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late night horror movie” and referred to efforts to do
away with the test as attempts to “drive[] pencils through the creature’s heart.” Id. at 398. It
would seem Justice Scalia regarded the Lemon test to be severely outmoded in light of his wish
that the test meet such a ghastly demise.
56. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
57. Id. at 671.
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Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, carolers, a cutout figure of a teddy
bear, and candy-striped poles, in addition to the nativity scene including a
Baby Jesus.58 In applying the Lemon test, the Court found that there was a
secular purpose, that the display neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and
that there was no excessive entanglement with state and religion.59 Though
this case did not involve a policy in the public schools, it is particularly
relevant because it is easy to see the Court’s holding extending to a situation
where a school permits a Christmas display to be erected during the holiday
season. As a result of Lynch, so long as a Christmas display incorporates all
the different holiday messages, from Santa Claus, to a Nativity scene, and even
including Hanukkah, it will not necessarily be considered a state promotion or
suppression of religion.
In the case of Wallace v. Jaffrey,60 the Court declared an Alabama statute
permitting public schools to institute a moment of silence unconstitutional on
Establishment clause grounds.61 The Alabama law authorized teachers in
public schools to hold a moment of silence during class.62 The relevant
statutory language provided:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public
schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may
announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no
other activities shall be engaged in.63

The Court held that this Alabama law was passed in an effort to establish
religion and was therefore unconstitutional.64 The Court was not satisfied that
despite the built-in choice between meditation and prayer the law was passed
for any other purpose than to establish religion and, specifically, school prayer
in the public school curriculum.65 Also of significance in the Wallace decision
was Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in which he expressed his view that the
Establishment clause prohibits governmental preference of one belief system
over another, but did not require absolute neutrality between “religion and
irreligion.”66
The Supreme Court extended its line of Establishment clause cases to
invalidate a public school district policy permitting prayer at graduations in

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 685.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Id. at 41-42, 61.
Id. at 40 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 56, 59-60.
472 U.S. at 58-60.
Id. at 113.
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Lee v. Weisman.67 The school district policy at issue in Lee permitted middle
school and high school principals to invite a clergyman to offer invocation and
benediction prayers at their school’s formal graduation ceremony.68 In Lee, the
principal of a middle school invited a rabbi to pray at graduation with
instructions to make the prayer nonsectarian.69 The Court held that the school
policy of allowing principals to invite members of the clergy to pray at
graduation was an establishment of religion and consequently
unconstitutional.70 The Court found an action by a state official, in this case a
public school principal, controlling the exercise of a formal religious
observance in a ceremony where the state compels attendance to be a violation
of the Establishment clause.71 The Court did not accept as an excuse that
attendance at graduation was voluntary,72 that the prayers were brief,73 that
there was a good-faith attempt to accommodate people’s beliefs by making the
prayer nonsectarian,74 and that the importance of the occasion would be
lessened to many in attendance if there was no prayer.75
With the Lee decision, the Court established that prayer at graduations
would be unconstitutional so long as the school officials were responsible for
including prayer in the graduation ceremony. The door was left open,
however, to student initiated, student organized graduation ceremonies that
included prayer. Thus, the issue of student-elected, student-led school prayer
became the next battleground in the Courts of Appeals.

67. 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
68. Id. at 581.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 599.
71. Id.
72. The Court acknowledged that there are events “which students, for all practical purposes,
are obliged to attend.” Id. at 589. The Court further concluded:
Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of
life’s most significant occasions. . . . Attendance may not be required by official decree,
yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in
any real sense of the term “voluntary,” for absence would require forfeiture of those
intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high
school years.
Id. at 595.
73. 505 U.S. at 594.
74. Id. at 588-90.
75. Id. at 595-96.
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

The Third and Ninth Circuits

In a case before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, ACLU of New Jersey
v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education,76 a public school policy
allowing the senior class to elect to have prayer at their high school graduation
ceremony was held to be unconstitutional in violation of the Establishment
clause.77 The school district policy gave the seniors three choices, “prayer, a
moment of reflection, or nothing at all.”78 In finding that the school district
policy was unconstitutional, the Third Circuit recognized that despite the
student election to include prayer, the school officials can still influence the
decision, which would represent the unconstitutional state endorsement of
religion; and that the policy still imposes on those students in the minority the
religious views of the majority, forcing them to either tolerate prayer or to not
participate in their high school graduation.79 The Third Circuit also seemed
willing to find that student control of a state sponsored graduation at a public
school would amount to a delegation of state power with the consequence
being that any student action to establish a religious practice would be “just as
constrained as [actions by] the state would be.”80
In a similar case before the Ninth Circuit, Harris v. Joint School District
No. 241,81 the court held unconstitutional a school board policy that allowed
high school students to plan every aspect of their high school graduation.82
The students themselves decided by written ballots, without interference from
the school officials, whether they would have prayer at their graduation
ceremony.83 The Ninth Circuit held that despite the policy permitting students
to elect to have prayer as a part of their graduation, the state involvement was
“pervasive enough to offend Establishment Clause concerns.”84 This would
seem to be particularly true in a community where the majority of the students
and school officials belong to the same religious denomination. Without
76. 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). See also C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2000) (en banc).
77. 84 F.3d at 1474.
78. Id. at 1475.
79. Id. at 1477-88. Also, for an in-depth look at the Black Horse decision, see Ann E.
Stockman, Comment, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education: The Black Sheep
of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1805 (1999).
80. Id. at 1483 (adopting the standard set forth in Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d
447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994)).
81. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 515
U.S. 1154 (1995). See also Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.
2000).
82. 41 F.3d at 452, 454, 457, 458.
83. Id. at 452.
84. Id. at 454.
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directly influencing the students in their capacity as school officials, it is clear
that pressure is still exerted on the students to control the message of the
graduation ceremony, and as such, the policy is a disguised attempt to allow
state promotion of religion. Additionally, in Harris, the Ninth Circuit
announced it was prepared to consider student control over a public school
graduation ceremony was, for all intents and purposes, state action, which
would implicate the protections of the Establishment Clause vis-à-vis the
Fourteenth Amendment;85 a standard, noted earlier, that was adopted by the
Third Circuit in Black Horse.86
B.

The Fifth Circuit

Joining the fray on the other side of this Circuit split, the Fifth Circuit
decided, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,87 that studentinitiated, student-led prayer at graduation was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause.88 In Jones, the Fifth Circuit upheld a graduation policy
that permitted student selection of a student volunteer to deliver a nonsectarian
prayer for the graduation ceremony.89 The decision to have the prayer was
reserved to the students.90 The Fifth Circuit held that there was “less
psychological pressure on students than the prayers at issue in Lee because all
students, after having participated in the decision of whether prayers will be
given, are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers.”91 The Fifth
Circuit justified this holding by claiming that fellow students “are less able to
coerce participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy.”92 This
holding seemingly ignores the influence of those school officials in small
communities, where the majority of students and school officials may attend
the same religious institution, who could use their status to exert pressure on
students to initiate religious practices at school ceremonies like graduation; this
would seem to allow for an end-run circumvention of the prohibitions of the
Establishment Clause because, in essence, by coercing student action, the
school officials who are actually behind the establishing of religion, are able to
avoid scrutiny by the mere technicality of labeling the religious practice as
85. Id. at 455.
86. 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
87. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 964-65, 964 n.1. The Fifth Circuit did, however, in a subsequent decision, hold
that school-sponsored prayer was not permitted at school sporting events. See Doe v.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995). This decision was reaffirmed by the
Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus,
it would seem that Jones applied only to prayer at graduation and would not protect studentinitiated prayer at sporting events if it appeared that the school had encouraged the prayer policy.
89. 977 F.2d at 964-65, 964 n.1.
90. Id. at 965 n.1.
91. Id. at 971.
92. Id.
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student-elected and student-led. In finding student-elected, student-led prayer
to not be an establishment of religion, and therefore, not a constitutional
violation, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is at conflict with the decisions from the
Third and the Ninth Circuits.
IV. ADLER I
In Adler v. Duval County School Board,93 the Eleventh Circuit had its
opportunity to join in on the split that had evolved between the Fifth and the
Third and Ninth Circuits. In holding that a school district policy allowing
student-elected, student-led prayer was not in violation of the Establishment
Clause,94 the Eleventh Circuit sided with the Fifth Circuit. The Eleventh
Circuit further indicated their affinity with the rationale of the Fifth Circuit by
rejecting the argument that the state had “created a sufficient link to the student
speaker to convert the student’s private speech into public, state-sponsored
speech.”95
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman, the Duval
County School Board changed its graduation policy.96 The new policy was
instituted through a memo from the Superintendent that “there should be no
prayer, benediction, or invocation at any graduation ceremonies.”97 A followup memorandum sent out months later from the school district’s legal affairs
officer, changed the policy yet again.98 The new policy, as outlined by the
legal affairs officer, indicated that some form of student-elected, student-led
prayer at graduation might be constitutional.99 This second memo, entitled
“Graduation Prayers”, contained the following guidelines for use by school
officials in determining what action to take “if the graduating students at your
school desire to have some type of brief opening and/or closing message by a
student”:
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two
minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the
discretion of the graduating senior class;

93. 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) [hereinafter Adler I], vacated, 121 S. Ct. 31
(2000) (remanding the case for “further consideration in light of Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000)), reinstated, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880 (11th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) [hereinafter Adler II].
94. Id. at 1071.
95. Id. at 1080 (holding that the “argument—that by providing the platform, the speech
becomes public—goes too far”).
96. Id. at 1071.
97. Id. at 1071, 1071 n.1 (quoting a memorandum from the Duval County School District
Superintendent).
98. 206 F. 3d at 1072.
99. Id.
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2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student
volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating
senior class as a whole;
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or closing
message, the content of that message shall be prepared by the student
volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by Duval
County School Board, its officers or employees.100
The Duval County School Board was held to have “left in force with the
acquiescence or tacit approval of the Board as its official policy” the contents
of the “Graduation Prayers” memo.101 During the seventeen high school
graduations that took place under the new policy, ten ceremonies had some
form of religious message while the other seven “were entirely secular in
nature.”102
The first challenge to the school district’s policy came shortly before the
class of 1993 graduated.103 The suit sought injunctive relief to prevent the
school district from permitting prayer at graduation.104 The injunctive relief
was denied on the grounds that the school district’s policy was constitutional105
and the case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.106 Because the
complainants had all graduated by the time the case was in the appeal stage,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the claims for injunctive relief were moot.107 As
a result, the school policy “remained the operative high school graduation
policy for Duval County.”108
Then, in 1998, another action109 was brought seeking temporary and
permanent injunctive relief, to prevent the Duval County School Board from
“permitting, conducting, or sponsoring any religious exercises or prayer and
instruction within the Duval County Public School District, including at School
Board-sponsored graduation ceremonies.”110 The injunctive relief was denied
and final judgment was entered in favor of the Duval County School Board.111
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit took up the issue of the constitutionality of
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting the finding of the district court in Adler v. Duval County School Board, 851
F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
102. Id. at 1072.
103. 206 F. 3d at 1072. See also Adler, 851 F. Supp 446.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1072-73.
106. Id. at 1073. See also Adler v. Duval County School Board, 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir.
1997).
107. Id.
108. 206 F. 3d at 1073.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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student-elected, student-led school prayer in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lee v. Weisman, and the split between the Fifth and the Third and
Ninth Circuits.
A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority held, in this case, that the school district’s policy was not an
establishment of religion and was therefore constitutional.112 The majority
recognized that “Establishment Clause jurisprudence calls for the difficult task
of separating a student’s private message, which may be religious in character,
from a state-sponsored religious message, protecting the former and
prohibiting the latter.”113 Implicit in this comment is the recognition that the
religion clauses also contain a prohibition against limiting an individual’s
rights protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.114
In comparing the school policy challenged in Lee, the Adler majority was
able to distinguish the facts in this case from those in Lee because in Adler the
school district was not exercising a policy whereby school officials directed the
inclusion of prayer in the graduation ceremony.115 The majority acknowledged
the split between the Fifth and the Third and Ninth Circuits116 and sided with
the Fifth by holding that the policy in the Duval County School District was
facially constitutional based on “the absence of state involvement in each of
the central decisions—whether a graduation message will be delivered, who
may speak, and what the content of the speech may be.”117 The majority found
that under “the Duval County graduation policy . . . neither the School Board
nor its principals may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a religious prayer or
message of any kind.”118
The majority rejected the appellant’s arguments that the student message
had become state-sponsored speech.119 The first argument, “that by providing
the platform and opportunity, the state has created a sufficient link to the
student speaker to convert the student’s private speech into public, statesponsored speech” was held to have gone “too far.”120 This argument was
rejected as overly broad because, “[t]o unnecessarily classify student speakers
as government actors could render . . . students powerless to express
religiously-inspired or religiously-influenced opinions at graduation.”121 The

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

206 F.3d at 1071.
Id. at 1074.
See id. at 1078.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1079 n.7.
206 F. 3d at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1080.
Id.
Id. at 1081.
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majority explained, “[t]he expression of religious beliefs, which are sacred to
some listeners, may be offensive to others,” but found that “the Constitution
does not prohibit the exercise of offensive speech at graduation ceremonies,
religious or otherwise; it only prohibits state expressions of religion. . . . The
occasional tolerance of speech we may deem offensive is one price we pay for
the First Amendment and our democratic traditions.”122 The second argument,
“that the majoritarian process of selecting the speaker shrouds the otherwise
private speech of a student with the imprint of the state,” was rejected as
illogical because, the majority reasoned, “[a]t most, a student speaker selected
by a class vote is a representative of the student body, not an official of the
state.”123
The majority then applied the Lee coercion test, to assess the degree, if
any, of “state control over the message at a graduation ceremony.”124 The test
focused on “whether the state has endorsed the message in an appreciable
manner, which, when combined with the inherent nature of the graduation
ceremony, obliges students to participate in a religious exercise.”125 The
majority found that “[w]hile there may be pressures on students to attend
graduation and conform with their peers, the state’s complete control over a
religious exercise, essential to Lee’s holding, is conspicuously absent here.”126
The majority went on to hold that the school policy was constitutional on its
face, that the complainants had not established that there were no set of
circumstances under which the policy could be constitutional, and rejected the
argument that the policy was coercive.127
The majority went on to apply the Lemon test and reached the same result,
that the school policy did “not facially violate the Establishment Clause.”128 In
evaluating whether the school policy had a “secular purpose”, the majority
found that the policy was supported by three sufficiently secular purposes:
First . . . affording graduating students an opportunity to direct their own
graduation ceremony by selecting a student speaker to express a message. . . .
Second, the School Board policy allows students to solemnize graduation as a
seminal educational experience. . . . [Third], the School Board’s policy also
evinces an important and long accepted secular interest in permitting student
freedom of expression, whether the content of the expression takes a secular or
religious form.129

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

206 F. 3d at 1081.
Id. at 1080, 1082.
Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
206 F. 3d at 1083.
Id. at 1084-91, 1090-91.
Id. at 1084, 1085.
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In finding that the school district had sufficient secular purposes for their
graduation policy, the majority rejected the arguments that: (1) “the School
Board promulgated the policy as a means to evade the strictures of Lee”; (2)
“the policy’s solely sectarian purpose is established by the title of the . . .
Memorandum, ‘Graduation Prayer’”; and (3) “comments made by some
members of the School Board . . . evince a wholly sectarian purpose.”130
The majority also found that the graduation policy did not violate the
second prong of the Lemon test because, on its face, the policy permitted the
student speaker to choose whether to deliver a secular, a religious, or a mixed
message, and therefore, could not be held to have a primary effect of
advancing religion.131 Likewise, the majority held that the Duval County
graduation policy “does not excessively entangle the Board with religion”
because the neutral, hands-off nature of the policy, in permitting student
elections, was less problematic—less entangled—than if the school policy had
been one of censorship.132 The majority concluded that “the Duval County
school system’s policy of permitting graduating students to decide through a
vote whether to have an unrestricted student graduation message at the
beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies does not facially violate the
Establishment Clause.”133
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent applied a similar analysis, incorporating state control,
coercion, and the Lemon test and came to the conclusion that the school
district’s policy was unconstitutional.134 The dissent, like the majority, applied
Lee v. Weisman as precedent in this school prayer at graduation case. Contrary
to the majority, however, the dissent found that the level of state control and
the extent of coercion weighed in favor of finding state action and,
consequently, a violation of the Establishment Clause.135 The dissent was
troubled by the fact that the school administration retained control over the
election process for the graduation ceremony and that the policy permitted an
elected student’s message to be delivered, during a limited amount of time, at
the beginning and/or the end of the ceremony.136 The dissent reasoned that
given the limited amount of time and based on the timing of when the student
message would be delivered during graduation, it was clear that the school
district had put into place a policy permitting only a limited range of speech.137
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1085, 1085-89.
Id. at 1089-90.
206 F. 3d at 1090.
Id. at 1090-91.
Id. at 1091-1103.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1092.
206 F. 3d at 1092.
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This finding, coupled with the district court’s finding that in Duval County
“invocations and benedictions have been traditional and are therefore familiar
if not expected at high school graduation ceremonies”138 led the dissent to find
that the school district had sufficient control over the speech to shift the burden
to the state to show that the “criteria for selecting the speaker . . . [is] not
related to the content of the speech.”139 This was particularly true where it
appeared that not only had the school involved itself in the choice to offer
student speech during the graduation ceremony, but had also “in some ways
encourage[d] the choice of prayer.”140 The dissent also found that the state had
coerced participation in a religious exercise, noting “[s]tudents cannot be
expected to express dissent [to student offered prayer] in this environment,
with the obligation of polite participation and the school authorities’ control
over the student decorum.”141
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s application of the Lemon
test.142 The dissent found that the secular justifications offered by the school
district to explain the purpose behind the school policy were “at best incidental
effects of the policy,” and that the “dominant reason” for the policy, which
only applied to “the portions of the [graduation] program historically devoted
to prayer,” was “to keep prayer in graduation ceremonies.”143
The dissent also found that the “primary effect” of the school policy was to
advance “more prayer at public events.”144 The reason for this was that after
Lee, it was unconstitutional to have the state provide for prayer at school
graduations, which would have reduced the number of permitted, statesanctioned prayers at graduation to zero. Now, the Duval County School
District had, in effect, a policy that allowed for ten out of seventeen school
graduation ceremonies, in the first year of the policy, to retain prayer at
graduation. Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the Duval County school policy
had, as its primary purpose, the “impermissible effect” of advancing a religious
practice.145
The dissent had found several independent justifications for finding the
Duval County school policy of permitting student-elected, student-led prayer at
graduation ceremonies to be unconstitutional. In its conclusion, the dissent
noted, “Duval County has not adopted a blanket approach of neutrality toward
religion or eliminated school sponsorship and control over graduation

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1097.
206 F. 3d at 1097-1101.
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1101-02, 1102.
Id. at 1102.
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ceremonies.”146 It added, “[t]he policy does not explicitly mention religion and
does not require any speech at all, but its terms nonetheless promote religious
expression.”147 For these reasons, and because the school policy did not stand
up to the coercion and Lemon tests, the dissent argued that the Duval County
school policy should have been found to be unconstitutional.148
V. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE
The United States Supreme Court got its opportunity to resolve the split
that had developed between the Fifth and Eleventh and the Third and Ninth
Circuits by granting certiorari149 in Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe.150 This case arose from the Fifth Circuit151 and involved questions
regarding school prayer in two contexts, at graduation and at high school
football games.152 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear only the issue
regarding whether the student-initiated, student-led school prayer at the
football games was a violation of the Establishment Clause.153 The Court
concluded that the School District’s policy of embracing prayer at the high
school football games was unconstitutional.154
The policy adopted by the Santa Fe Independent School District, originally
titled “Prayer at Football Games,”155 “authorized two student elections, the
first to determine whether ‘invocations’ should be delivered, and the second to
select the spokesperson to deliver them.”156 The relevant language of the
school board’s policy provided:
[E]ach spring, the high school student council shall conduct an election, by the
high school student body, by secret ballot, to determine whether such a
statement or invocation will be a part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so,
shall elect a student, from a list of student volunteers, to deliver the statement
or invocation. The student volunteer who is selected by his or her classmates
may decide what message and/or invocation to deliver, consistent with the
goals and purposes of this policy.157

146. Id. at 1105.
147. 206 F. 3d at 1081.
148. Id.
149. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999).
150. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
151. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999).
152. Id. at 809.
153. 120 S. Ct. at 2275. See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2273. The name of the school district’s policy was later changed to “PRE-GAME
CEREMONIES AT FOOTBALL GAMES.” Id. at 2273 n.6.
156. Id. at 2273.
157. Id. at 2273 n.6. The language cited here represents the school district’s amended policy
entitled “Pre-Game Ceremonies at Football Games,” which was implemented subsequent to the
“Prayer at Football Games” policy. The difference between the policies is highlighted by the
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The policy not only set out the procedure for the student elections but, in a
separate section, it also provided for a contingency should the policy be
challenged and “enjoined by a court order.”158 In the event that the policy was
challenged and enjoined, the following language was added to the policy,
“[a]ny message and/or invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian
or nonproselytizing.”159
In this case, under the “Prayer at Football Games” policy, the students
elected to have a pre-game “invocation” and in a separate election, chose a
“student council chaplain” who was to “deliver[] a prayer over the public
address system before each varsity football game for the entire season.”160
Subsequent to the elections, the policy was amended and renamed, “Pre-Game
Ceremonies at Football Games.”161 The new policy coupled the words
“statement” and “message” to “invocation” where the original policy had only
used the term “invocation.”162 Even though the School District policy
changed, no new election was held under the terms of the amended policy.163
Essentially, then, the policy the students voted under established that what was
to be delivered by the elected student before every home football game was an
“invocation.”164 This policy of establishing student-elected, student-led prayer
before football games was challenged as a violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
A.

The Majority Opinion

Justice Stevens, writing for a 6-3 majority, opened his opinion by
distinguishing between “government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”165 In evaluating the School
District’s policy, the Majority found that, “[i]n this case . . . the ‘degree of
school involvement’ makes it clear that the pregame prayers bear ‘the imprint
of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable

dropping of the word “prayer” from the title and the addition of “message” and “statement”
language to go along with “invocation” in the amended policy. This is significant because the
only policy actually voted on by the students spoke only to “prayer” and “invocation”; after
amending the language, the School District did not hold a new election under the new policy. Id.
at 2273 n.5, 2279.
158. 120 S. Ct. at 2273 n.6.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2271.
161. Id. at 2273.
162. Id.
163. 120 S. Ct. at 2273 n.5, 2279.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2275 (quoting Board of Educ. of Westside Comm. Sch.v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250 (1990)).
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position.’”166 The conclusion the Majority arrived at was that “[t]he delivery
of such a message—over the school’s public address system, by a speaker
representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and
pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public
prayer—is not properly characterized as ‘private’ speech.”167 The Court found
that not only was “it clear that the students understood that the central question
before them [in the election] was whether prayer should be a part of the
pregame ceremony”, but also that “the evolution of the current policy . . .
indicate[d] that the District intended to preserve the practice of prayer before
football games”, especially in light of the District’s failure to conduct a new
election under the new policy.168
By not characterizing the speech as private, the implication was that the
speech must belong to the state. After establishing state action, one of the
questions became whether the speech attributable to the state was an
endorsement of religion. The Majority sought the answer to that question by
applying the first element of the Lemon test, to determine whether the Duval
County School District policy had a “secular purpose.”169 The School District
argued that the purpose of their policy was to “foster free expression of private
persons . . . promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and establish an
appropriate environment for competition.”170 Clearly not persuaded by the
School District’s rationale, the Majority found that the “approval of only one
specific kind of message, an ‘invocation,’ is not necessary to further any of
[those] purposes.”171 They further added that it was “reasonable to infer that
the specific purpose of the policy was to preserve a popular ‘state-sponsored
religious practice.’”172
Having found no “secular purpose” and after characterizing the speech as
attributable to the state, not private speech, the Majority had sufficient grounds
to find the School District’s policy violated the Establishment Clause as
governmental endorsement of religion. But, before declaring the District’s
policy unconstitutional, Justice Stevens analyzed the policy’s coercive effects.
In particular, Justice Stevens was concerned with two aspects of coercion. The
first aspect he considered was whether the policy coerced student participation
in a religious ceremony. The School District argued “that there [wa]s no
impermissible government coercion because the pregame messages [we]re the
product of student choices.”173 Justice Stevens disagreed, finding that because
166.
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the School District had provided the “election mechanism” and the forum for
the student debates “that presumably must [have] precede[d] each” of the
elections, the District’s policy had “impermissibly invaded that private sphere”
of “preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship.”174 The
School District’s policy, therefore, represented governmental control over
student participation in religious expression, “a result”, according to the
Majority, “at odds with the Establishment Clause.”175
The second aspect of coercion that Justice Stevens addressed, for the
Majority, pertained to whether coercion could exist at all, given the voluntary
nature of attending football games. Here, the Majority distinguished
attendance at football games from attendance at graduation ceremonies,
finding, “the informal pressure to attend an athletic event is not as strong as a
senior’s desire to attend her own graduation ceremony.”176 Yet, despite the
fact that attendance at football games might be considered less important than
graduation, the Majority found that some of the participants, including band
members, cheerleaders, and members of the football team, might be
participating for “class credit” and that, therefore, their attendance was
mandatory.177 The Majority also found that the other students, whose
commitments did not make attendance compulsory, might feel compelled to
attend the games based on peer pressure or out of a yearning for a “complete
educational experience” or they might “voluntarily choose not to attend.”178
Either way, the Majority held, students should not be forced into the position
where the decision as to whether to attend a football game is based on the “risk
[of] facing a personally offensive religious ritual.”179 Justice Stevens further
held, “[e]ven if we regard every high school student’s decision to attend a
home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that
the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those
present to participate in an act of religious worship.”180
The Majority also found successful a facial challenge to the School
District’s policy.181 They reasoned that if the purpose of the policy failed the
secular purpose arm of the Lemon test, then the policy must be declared
unconstitutional.182 The Majority held, “[w]e refuse to turn a blind eye to the
context in which this policy arose, and that context quells any doubt that this
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policy was implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer.”183
Because the Duval County policy “unquestionably ha[d] the purpose and
create[d] the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of
important school events”, the Majority found it facially unconstitutional.184
For the reasons that the School District’s policy represented a coercive
governmental endorsement of religion, with no secular purpose, the Majority
declared the District’s policy unconstitutional.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Chief
Justice Rehnquist attacked the Majority’s holding based on “content neutrality”
and private speech lines of reasoning. He wrote, “our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence simply does not mandate ‘content neutrality.’”185 Neutrality of
the student message was not required, he argued, because the speech in
question represented private speech.186 To distinguish between private and
government speech, the Chief Justice argued:
Here . . . the potential speech at issue . . . would be a message or invocation
selected or created by a student. That is, if there were speech at issue here, it
would be private speech. The ‘crucial difference between government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect,’
applies with particular force to the question of endorsement.”187

By so arguing, the Chief Justice indicated that the District’s policy should be
constitutional if the speech were completely free of any governmental
influence and merely the product of one student’s choice to exercise his or her
right to free exercise and free speech. By looking to the language of the school
policy, he found that the inclusion of the words “message” and “statement”
illustrated the School District’s recognition of the students’ freedom to elect
and deliver a message free from the control of the school.188 This, he argued,
established that the student message was individual speech, not government
speech.
The Dissent also took issue with the outcome of the facial challenge.189
The Chief Justice was not convinced that the sole purpose of the School
District’s policy was to establish school prayer and thought that more
deference should have been given to the School District’s justifications: “To
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to
183.
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establish the appropriate environment for competition.”190 He argued that by
amending the policy, the School District had created the possibility that the
message could contain a non-religious message.191 He also seemed to indicate
that because the amended policy had not been the subject of a new vote, it had
not been implemented.192 For this reason, he would have found that the facial
challenge was brought prematurely on the ground that “[h]ad the policy been
put into practice . . . [it] would likely pass constitutional muster.”193 For these
reasons, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other Dissenters would not have
invalidated the School District’s policy.194
VI. ADLER II
After vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Adler I, the Supreme
Court remanded the case back to the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in
light of Santa Fe.195 Jurisdiction was, at that point, vested again in the
Eleventh Circuit to render a decision in the Adler case. After reconsideration,
the same en banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit that decided Adler I, held that
Santa Fe did not alter their earlier decision and reinstated Adler I.196
In an 8-4 decision, which saw two of the judges who had voted to uphold
the school policy in Adler I switch sides to join in the dissent, the Eleventh
Circuit held that Santa Fe did not “alter the outcome in this case” because the
Supreme Court, in Santa Fe, did not “promulgate” any new rule of law which
had not been applied in Adler I.197 Therefore, the majority reasoned, there was
no need to undertake a new analysis and the previous decision was reinstated.
The court further noted that “it is impossible to say that the Duval County
policy on its face violates the Establishment Clause without effectively
banning all religious speech at school graduations . . . . Santa Fe does not go
that far, and we are not prepared to take such a step.”198
After reinstating their previous Adler decision, the majority reviewed its
decision in Adler I, and compared it to Santa Fe. The Eleventh Circuit found
that Santa Fe was a very fact driven decision with facts that were

190. Id. at 2286.
191. Id. at 2285.
192. Id. at 2285 n.2.
193. Id. at 2287. The Majority’s response to this line of reasoning argued that the policy in
place at the time of the student elections contemplated only “invocations.” The only message,
therefore, that the students had elected to incorporate related to prayer. The choice of message
envisioned by the Dissent had not been voted on by the students, hence the students never had the
opportunity to select a non-religious message. Id. at 2283 n.24.
194. 120 S. Ct. at 2288.
195. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000).
196. See Adler II, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880, at *2 (11th Cir. 2001).
197. Id. at *28-29.
198. Id. at *2-3.
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“fundamentally different” from Adler and thus held that Santa Fe did not
“erase the critical facts . . . that underla[id]” their opinion in Adler I.199 The
majority found that the basis for distinguishing the cases rested with the
difference between the school policies with regard to the degree of school
district control over the content of the delivered message and the extent to
which the policies differed in inviting religious messages.200 The court found
further divergence between the cases based on the secular purpose element of
the Lemon test; because as the court had found in Adler I, the Duval County
policy, as opposed to the Santa Fe policy, had a secular purpose.201 Based on
their ability to distinguish the facts in Adler from Santa Fe, and their finding
that Santa Fe did not create a need for redoing their analysis, the majority
reinstated their earlier opinion without offering any new analysis.
The dissent, which doubled in size from Adler I, took issue with the
majority in two separate opinions. The first dissenting opinion took issue with
the majority’s finding that the Duval County policy had a secular
purpose.202According to Judge Kravitch:
[B]ecause the record reflects that the purpose of the Duval policy is to endorse
prayer at graduation ceremonies, and because the scheme allowing the student
majority to decide whether to include does not cure the problem of the policy’s
impermissible, religious purpose, in my view the Duval policy fails to comply
with the Supreme Court’s directive in Santa Fe and thus facially violates the
Establishment Clause.203

In a separate dissent, Judge Carnes added to Judge Kravitch’s dissent by
arguing that the majority should have spent less effort trying to distinguish
Santa Fe factually from Adler, and more time trying to ascertain the message
that the Supreme Court was trying to convey in Santa Fe.204 He argued that
Santa Fe should have taught that “a school board may not delegate to the
student body or some subgroup of it the power to do by majority vote what the
school board itself may not do.”205 He added, “the majority should not be
allowed to force its religious views on those in the minority. Our Constitution
ensures that when it comes to religion, it is the conscience of the individual
rather than the will of the majority that rules.”206 For these reasons he would
have found that the Duval County policy facially violated the Establishment
Clause.207
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VII. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court took on the issue of student-elected, student-led prayer
in its Santa Fe decision and, by so doing, attempted to resolve a split that had
developed among the Circuit Courts of Appeals. In Santa Fe, the Court had
the opportunity to decide the issue of student-initiated prayer in two
contexts.208 The choice to hear the issue of school prayer only in the context of
student prayer at football games was significant. One possible explanation for
why the Court chose not to hear the issue of prayer at graduation would be that
the Court felt it was unnecessary to revisit the issue in light of past
decisions.209 This position is undermined, however, by the existence of the
Circuit split and the opportunity the case represented to resolve that split.
Certainly, a better explanation is that the Court granted certiorari, limited to the
issue of student-elected, student-led prayer at football games, because the
message sent by a decision regarding prayer at football games would extend
the Establishment Clause beyond the scope previously encompassed by the
prayer at graduation cases. That is, if the Court were to invalidate a school
policy permitting prayer at an activity seemingly more voluntary than a
graduation ceremony, then surely a school policy instituting prayer at a
graduation would be invalid. By extending its school prayer Establishment
Clause jurisprudence to invalidate school policies instituting school prayer
during activities that are not mandatory, the Court had seemingly laid down a
fairly broad standard.
The Court arrived at its holding in Santa Fe, invalidating a school policy
creating student elections to permit prayer at high school football games, by
finding that the student-elected, student-led prayer was attributable to the state.
Had the Court found otherwise, that the prayer delivered at football games, in
accordance with the district’s policy, was private speech, then the protections
of the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment would
have spared the policy and the speech would have been protected.
In a fact sensitive analysis, the Court attributed the prayer delivered at
football games to government-endorsed speech. This represented an important
doctrinal development driven by the focus on the procedure allowing for the
student elections. In finding that the school district was ultimately behind the
speech, the Court declared that a school district that controls the content of a
message, to invite a religious practice, and coerces participation in that practice
is in control of the speech ultimately delivered. This result firmly establishes
that school districts who control the decision making process violate the
208. The Court had the opportunity to determine the constitutionality of school policies that
permitted prayer at both graduation and at high school football games. See 120 S. Ct. at 2271-75.
The Court only granted certiorari to hear the issue in the context of football games. See Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002 (1999).
209. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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Establishment Clause by instituting school policies permitting school prayer,
even though the prayer is student-elected and student-led.
The holding in Santa Fe should have extended to the Circuit split that
existed before it was decided. The Supreme Court, in particular, must have
thought that the Santa Fe decision had an impact on the split and certainly, at
least, on the rules promulgated in the Eleventh Circuit, based on the action
taken by the Court to remand Adler back to the Eleventh Circuit for “further
proceedings in light of” Santa Fe.210 When, in Adler II, the Eleventh Circuit,
on remand, reinstated Adler I, the split in the Circuits was left intact with cases
in the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits still at odds cases in the Third and Ninth.
The unfortunate result of leaving the split unreconciled is that the
constitutional question of whether policies of student-elected, student-led
prayer at school graduation ceremonies are permissible are open and left to
depend on the randomness of the geographical locale of the school district that
has, or is establishing, a policy permitting students to elect to include a
religious message in their graduation.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit had the opportunity to revisit their
decision in Adler. By reinstating their earlier decision after distinguishing the
facts in Santa Fe as “fundamentally different,”211 the Eleventh Circuit added
no new analysis, and thereby missed an opportunity to provide more depth to
the legal debate between the Circuits, which could have provided the Supreme
Court, should they again decide to grant certiorari in Adler, a better foundation
to work from, in generating an opinion that clarifies Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in the student-elected, student-led school prayer arena. Perhaps
some members of the en banc panel realized that by vacating and remanding
the case the Supreme Court was providing the Eleventh Circuit with the
opportunity to more fully develop this body of legal scholarship. After all,
Judge Carnes wrote in his dissent, “we ought to spend less time comparing the
factual and procedural details of the Santa Fe case to this one and more time
considering the lessons that decision teaches.”212
The end result of Adler II is that the Circuit split remains unresolved. The
question now is whether the continued existence of the Circuit split will
prompt the Supreme Court to grant certiorari again in this case. Because this
case involves a substantial issue pertaining to fundamental rights under the
First Amendment, this case should have enough inertia to warrant a second
look by the Supreme Court. This, coupled with a significant amount of
treatment by the Courts of Appeals, should give the Supreme Court sufficient
justification to grant certiorari. Based on a compelling need to resolve the split
on a federal issue of substantial weight and with a solid foundation of legal
210. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000).
211. Adler II, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880, at *9.
212. Id. at *50.
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analysis to draw upon, the case is worthy of being granted review by the Court.
After all, if the case had a compelling enough question, before Adler II, for the
Court to grant certiorari, by virtue of the fact that Adler II was simply a
reinstatement of the opinion vacated by the Supreme Court, it follows that the
issue is still sufficiently vibrant for the Court to want to resolve it, especially in
light of Adler II.
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Adler, the relevant analysis was
set out in Santa Fe. In light of Santa Fe, the first step in analyzing the Duval
County policy will involve an assessment of whether the action taken by the
students in electing to have a speaker at graduation ceremonies is government
action. This question will ultimately turn on a fact specific analysis of the
extent to which the Duval County School District exerts control over the
content of the message delivered by the student speaker, the extent to which
the policy invites a religious message, and the extent to which the District
coerces participation in the message. The ultimate resolution of this factual
determination should be that the action represented government action.
The Supreme Court should not be persuaded, as was a majority of the
Eleventh Circuit, that because the policy appears to be hands off that it does
not exert some control over the content of the message. After all, were it not
for the policy it would be true that in exactly none of the graduation
ceremonies would prayer be allowed to be accommodated, whereas, after
enacting the policy, ten out of seventeen graduation ceremonies had some for
of religious message. Again, turning to Judge Carnes’ dissent, “[s]ixty percent
is no perfection, but it is close enough for government work.”213
The flip side of that argument, as noted in Judge Marcus’ opinion for the
majority in Adler II, is that the school district does not exert any control
because “it cannot be plausibly argued that, on its face, the Duval County
policy calls for a student vote on whether to mandate the inclusion of prayer in
a graduation ceremony.”214 This position is tenuous at best, however, based on
the logistical limitation imposed by the school district. The school district may
not be mandating that the students elect up or down on whether to have prayer,
but because of the limitation of the policy to provide the opportunity for
student speech, only in the context of an opening or closing message, not to
take longer than two minutes, and at a time when prayer had traditionally been
offered during past graduations, it would seem that the school district is
imposing an element of control over the possible types of messages
deliverable. After all, by imposing the two minute limit and by directing that
the speech will occur at the beginning and/or end of the graduation ceremony,
it looks as if the district has asserted control over content and based on the

213. Adler II, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880, at *55.
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context in which the speech is limited, even looks like the district is inviting
some form of prayer or other religious solemnization of the graduation.
Another aspect for the Supreme Court to scrutinize, should the Court
decide to hear this case, pertains to the level of coerced participation the Duval
County School District creates. Based on the extension of Establishment
Clause protections to ban prayer at a more voluntary school event such as
football games in Santa Fe, it would seem that given an event like a high
school graduation, the risks of forced participation are much greater. The
analysis should focus, as it did in Santa Fe,215 on those students who must
participate, only this time in a graduation context. Though the situation is
arguably different from a high school football game, there are still students
who mandatorily participate in graduation, such as a band member playing
“Pomp and Circumstance” during the graduation ceremony. In addition,
unlike going to football games, going through graduation is a one-time right of
passage event. Even though attending graduation is not a prerequisite for
being awarded a diploma, it signals the end of formal education for many
graduating seniors and even for those students pursuing more education, high
school graduation is a portal one must pass through on the way to higher
education. Because high school graduation is such an important event,
mandatory participation should almost be presumed and any action taken by a
school district to impose some form of ceremony during graduation should be
perceived as coercing the participation of all students participating in the
graduation ceremony. As such, the Duval County policy coerces student
participation in what likely—based on ten out of seventeen graduation
ceremonies—will be a religious ceremony at the beginning and/or end of the
graduation ceremony.
The third significant factor in the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Fe
that should govern a Supreme Court analysis in Adler relates to the secular
purpose of the Duval County policy. The Eleventh Circuit found that the
Duval County policy had the non-religious purposes of enabling graduating
seniors the “opportunity to direct their own graduation ceremony”, “solemnize
graduation as a seminal education experience”, and of “permitting student
freedom of expression.”216 This was a critical determination because, based on
Santa Fe, had the secular purpose analysis resulted in a finding of a nonsecular, religious purpose, the policy would have been facially
unconstitutional.217 Contrary to the finding of the Eleventh Circuit, when
viewed in its overall context, the Duval County policy “evinces an
impermissible religious purpose.”218 Several factors should play into this
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analysis, everything from whether prayer was routinely a part of past
ceremonies to the name of the policy itself. In this case, starting with the title
of the memorandum establishing the Duval County policy, “Graduation
Prayers”,219 much about the school district policy makes the policy look like an
attempt to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition on state endorsement of
school prayer. After all, as noted earlier, given the option without a school
policy to have zero prayer at graduation, in a district where prayer had
traditionally been a part of graduation, it seems clear that the purpose of
enacting a school policy such as the Duval County School District’s is to
ensure that some form of school prayer is preserved. Because the policy was
generated with an eye towards finding a way to get around the ban on school
endorsed prayer at graduation an because it had the effect of generating, in
sixty percent of the graduation ceremonies in Duval County in 1993, for
example, some form of religious message, it seems pretty clear that the policy
had the impermissible purpose of establishing prayer at graduation ceremonies.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case and the final
outcome should be that the Duval County School District “Graduation
Prayers” policy is held to be facially unconstitutional because, at a minimum,
is has an impermissible religious purpose. In doing so, the Supreme Court
should declare that attempts to circumvent the Establishment Clause by school
district policies which are thinly veiled attempts to ensure that prayer remains a
part of graduation ceremonies are unconstitutional and resolve the split among
the Courts of Appeals on this issue. In the end, as Judge Carnes wrote, “the
majority should not be allowed to force its religious views on those in the
minority. Our Constitution ensures that when it comes to religion, it is the
conscience of the individual rather than the will of the majority that rules.”220
This is not to say that student-elected, student-led prayer at graduation is
necessarily unconstitutional. So long as the message is the manifestation of an
individual, based on that individual’s own agenda, the exercise of Free Speech
and Free Exercise should be protected. Thus, if a graduating senior, such as
the valedictorian, were asked to speak at graduation, there can be no conflict
with the Establishment Clause for the valedictorian to offer a religious message
during a graduation speech because of the student’s right to Free Speech and
Free Exercise. The conflict with the Establishment Clause arises only when
the state, in this instance the school, attempts to control the student speech in
an effort to impermissibly create the suggestion that prayer should be a part of
graduation ceremonies. Unfortunately, line drawing becomes difficult in this
context as school districts may, for example, attempt to shift the timing of the
two minutes permitted for student speech to, say, the middle of the graduation
ceremony. Because prayer is traditionally not delivered in the middle of a
219. 206 F.3d at 1072.
220. Adler II, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8880, at *55-56.
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ceremony, future school policies attempting this sort of manipulation may look
arguably less and less like attempts to establish prayer. Despite the potential
difficulty in developing an all-encompassing rule that would apply in each and
every attempt to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition on state
establishment of religion, the Supreme Court may get the opportunity to do just
that, in the context of student-elected, student-led prayer at graduation
ceremonies, if the Court decides to once again consider the Adler case.
As for the situation with the family in the introductory hypothetical, the
oldest child is definitely between a rock and a hard place and there may not be
a straightforward solution to his dilemma. The ultimate resolution of any
Establishment Clause challenge to the school policy, in light of Santa Fe and
maybe ultimately Adler, will depend on the level of control exerted by the
school district over the content of the message, the degree to which the district
encourages religious messages, and the extent of coerced participation.
Another factor that will certainly be critical to a determination of the
constitutionality of the school district’s policy is the purpose of the policy. If
the family can show that the purpose of the school policy was to establish
prayer at the graduation ceremony then the policy facially violates the
Constitution according to Santa Fe. Some evidence that the purpose may
arguably be impermissible lies in the title of the policy, “Invocation at
Graduation.” Still more evidence of the policy’s purpose might be found by
looking at the school district’s graduation traditions. If prayer has historically
been a part of graduation the more the policy begins to look like it has the
impermissible purpose of establishing prayer. Based on Santa Fe, it may be
that the policy can be successfully challenged. In this hypothetical, a
successful challenge would seem particularly gratifying, as the threat of
tyranny by the majority and the restriction placed on the teenager’s right to
Free Exercise are particularly troubling. Unfortunately, based on real-life
scenarios,221 it may also be true that social pressures, and sometimes even
threats, may be enough to sufficiently discourage challenging what may
otherwise be an unconstitutional policy, whereby personal liberty is sacrificed
at the hands of tyranny of the majority.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With the decision in the Santa Fe case, the Supreme Court appeared to
have suggested a resolution to the Circuit split that had developed between the
Fifth and Eleventh and the Third and Ninth Circuits. It seemed by remanding
the Adler case,222 that the Supreme Court had, in effect, sent an edict to the
Eleventh Circuit, the message being that in extending the prohibition against

221. See infra note 2.
222. See Adler v. Duval County School Board, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000).
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school prayer to an event as voluntary as a high school football game, short of
an independent, non-school sponsored message during a graduation ceremony,
no school endorsed prayer, student-led, student-initiated or not, will be
constitutionally permitted. Hopefully, the ultimate outcome in Adler will yield
a decision that not only keeps intact the prohibition against state establishment
of religion but also keeps intact every individual’s right to Free Speech and
Free Exercise, no matter what minority belief an individual may espouse. In
the end, no person, adult or child, should have to endure the tyranny of
government establishment of the majority’s beliefs, simply because the
majority has the sheer numbers to control an election. The religion clauses
should not be read to kindle the idea of toleration, but instead, neutrality and
non-favoritism. Nobody’s beliefs should have to take a back seat to state
interference simply because the majority of a community, at that particular
place and time, feels otherwise. In the end, the Santa Fe decision represents an
important moment in the history of school prayer jurisprudence because it
represents an extension of the Establishment Clause to invalidate school
policies that endorse religion to activities that extend beyond mandatory
classroom participation, whether it be a high school graduation or attending a
high school football game. The Adler case, then, represents an important
crossroads opportunity for the Supreme Court. They should seize this
historical moment to grant certiorari and to determine whether and to what
extent the Duval County policy has the invidious purpose of school control
over religious expression. In so doing, the message from Santa Fe should be
trumpeted loud and clear, that preventing tyranny of the majority will provide
students in public schools with meaningful choices throughout their scholastic
experience, up through graduation, free from coercive school policies designed
to force toleration at the expense of personal liberty.
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